One of the easiest ways to make your content, product, or service disappear into the crowd is to study your competitors too closely.
When a company starts struggling, one of the first things the team usually does is look sideways. What are our competitors building? What features do they advertise? What keywords do they target? How do they describe themselves?
Then they imitate the things that appear to be making them successful.
The problem is that everyone else is doing exactly the same thing.
The imitation of success eventually produces sameness.
And in the age of AI, I think this problem is about to get considerably worse.
In this case study, I’ll show you how we escaped that trap with Dittofi. Instead of trying to beat our competitors at their game, we deliberately did things differently.
Within a week, and without changing the underlying product, we found something close to marketing alchemy. Monthly sales grew from almost nothing to more than $80,000 — an annualized run rate approaching $1 million.

The Challenge
In 2021, Dittofi was positioned as the world’s first full-stack hybrid no-code platform. It was an exceptionally powerful product, with thousands of features spanning multiple use cases and the ability to build highly customized applications.
Initially, we positioned Dittofi around that technical superiority: a more powerful, flexible, and complete alternative to conventional no-code platforms.
The problem was that much of this differentiation was invisible to the customer. The product was highly technical, while many of the people evaluating it were not. At the same time, Dittofi was competing against increasingly well-funded platforms that were spending heavily on advertising, producing enormous libraries of educational content, and making broadly similar claims about what their products could build.
As a result, prospective customers struggled to understand the product’s unique value proposition. Customer acquisition costs were extremely high and activation rates were very low.

The Strategy
We formed a cross-functional growth team and mapped the customer journey from acquisition through to successful launch. We instrumented a sales and marketing funnel, analyzed behaviour, and interviewed customers to understand why – in such a crowded market – some customers chose to go with us.
This analysis revealed that more than 80% of our customers wanted to build a two-sided marketplace like Airbnb, Etsy, or Fiverr. They compared Dittofi to a sub-category of no-code platforms: marketplace builders.
This revealed an entirely different axis of competition. Rather than trying to change what customers believed about no-code, we positioned Dittofi around beliefs they already held: marketplace builders were fast but users could not build custom transaction flows without hiring expensive engineers. Dittofi could sit between the two.

The Execution
After repositioning Dittofi as a marketplace builder, approximately 4,000 users signed up in a single month. Only three successfully launched — but all three became paying customers.
From these three customers, we saw that rather than customizing everything themselves, they trusted our expertise, followed our process, launched a basic marketplace quickly, and then worked with our marketing team to generate their first transaction.
So we redesigned the offer around customers who wanted a proven path rather than another tool to figure out themselves. We created a minimum viable marketplace template and packaged Dittofi into a $5,000 guided implementation program covering onboarding, hosting, training, launch, and marketing support.
Then we changed the message from what the product could do to what the customer could achieve:
“Launch your own marketplace like Airbnb, Etsy or Fiverr — in four weeks, guaranteed.”
We were no longer selling marketplace software. We were selling a system for getting a marketplace into the market.

ℹ️ Note
Notice that this was our second repositioning. We were no longer selling a marketplace builder; we were selling a proven path to launch. By increasing the customer’s perceived likelihood of success, we could charge significantly more than self-service platforms while remaining far more affordable than custom development — creating a position between the two that we could uniquely own.

The Outcome
The change in business strategy had the following business impact:
| Strategy | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Positioning | Full-stack no-code platform | Marketplace Launch System |
| Core Offer | SaaS platform | Productized implementation program |
| Target Market | Broad no-code audience | Marketplace founders |
| North Star Metric | None | Successful marketplace launches |
The change in growth across our funnel can be captured by in the following growth KPIs.
| Metric | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Time to Value | ~12 months | 4 weeks |
| Activation Rate | 3 / 4,000 0.08% | 20 / 100 20% |
| CAC Payback Period | Long / Unknown | ~30 days |
| Upfront Revenue | $0 | $60,000 |
| Launch Rate | 0.08% | 80% |
| MRR Added | $0 | $89,000 |
| Customer Journey | Self-service | Guided implementation |
ℹ️ Please Note
Dittofi’s founding team and I sold its assets to Belgium-based investment fund CF-2 in 2026. The new owners subsequently broadened the positioning again, moving Dittofi into the crowded vibe and visual coding market.
In my view, this recreates the problem we originally faced: competing against platforms such as Base44, Lovable, and dozens of other AI builders for customers who already believe these products can turn a prompt into an application quickly.
Dittofi may once again be technically different, but unless that difference occupies a meaningful place in the customer’s existing belief system, it risks looking the same. However, I have saved some screenshots of Dittofi’s re-positioned marketplace solution that you can see below:

If you’d like help building a marketing system that makes your product, service, or ideas stand out in the age of AI, book a call below.